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Heterogeneity among agent types and second-best management for non-market ecological 
services 
Second-best management affects different agent types differently, and heterogeneity among 
agents may create instances when only second best management is feasible.  Capital-theoretic 
bioeconomic modeling often has imposed representative agent assumptions that may not capture 
this heterogeneity.  Interactions between agent heterogeneity and second-best management have 
received little attention.  Such heterogeneity is particularly important when management actions 
do not directly affect extensive margin decisions.  We employ a microparameter model in a 
dynamic bioeconomic model to incorporate agent heterogeneity and intensive and extensive 
margin decisions for a nonmarket good, recreational fishing.  The model yields qualitatively 
different management recommendations when a representative agent is assumed than when 
heterogeneity is included using the microparameter approach.       
 
 
Key words: entry-exit, microparameter; bioeconomics; recreational fishing; landing limits; 
optimal control. 
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Introduction 
It is common to assume a representative individual in capital-theoretic bioeconomic modeling.  
This implies that individuals are homogeneous or that heterogeneities are unimportant.  
Furthermore, it is common to assume a social planner that directly controls, or can strictly 
enforce, interactions with the ecological system (e.g., the number of fish to harvest in a fishery).  
This may be problematic when considering non-market ecosystem services (e.g., recreational 
fishing) for two reasons.  First, the value of non-market services are not coordinated in the 
market and do not obey the “law of one price.”  This means that least-cost individuals, as 
measured by travel costs or other common means, may not be the individuals that derive the 
most consumer surplus from fishing.  Second, institutional constraints may prevent managers 
from choosing a first-best policy and directly controlling interactions with the ecological system 
(Dasgupta and Maler 2003).  Such indirect management is inherently second-best.  Whenever 
second-best management is considered it will affect different agent types differently, and 
heterogeneity among agents may create instances when only second best management is feasible.  
For example, first-best management in a recreational fishery with heterogeneous anglers requires 
choosing a management program that includes the number of anglers and which anglers 
participate (Anderson 1993).  Schnier and Anderson (2006) provide empirical evidence for the 
importance of heterogeneity in the case of commercial natural resource extraction. There is a 
need to consider heterogeneity explicitly, and ignoring heterogeneity (i.e., focusing on a 
representative individual) may lead to qualitatively different results relative to the case when 
heterogeneity is considered.   
  Heterogeneity is of increasing interested in bioeconomic analysis.  There is an increasing 
number of analyses that focus on the resource heterogeneity (e.g., Sanchirico and Wilen’s 1999   4
and Smith and Wilen’s 2003 applications to spatial heterogeneity).  Random parameter models 
(e.g., Train 1998) are increasingly used in econometric studies to capture agent heterogeneity.  In 
this paper we show how agent heterogeneity may be incorporated into a capital-theoretic 
bioeconomic problem using a micro-parameter or micro-unit model approach (Hochman and 
Zilberman 1979).  This approach uses a distribution of agent types to incorporate heterogeneity.  
By integrating over the distribution is possible to scale up from the scale of an individual’s 
decision to model aggregate demand for nonmarket recreational goods.  This allows us to derive 
the social planner’s objective function from individual utility maximization and thereby address 
issue associated with a lack of market coordination.  Furthermore, the microparameter approach 
enables intensive margin decisions and extensive margin decisions to be modeled endogenously 
based on microeconomic theory.  Kuhn-Tucker models have greatly expanded research on 
extensive margin decisions (i.e., corner solutions) (Phaneuf et al. 2000), but given their 
complexity, they have not yet been integrated with dynamic resource models. The 
microparameter approach provides a deterministic approximation to the Kuhn-Tucker model.  
The microparameter approach is easier to combine with dynamic resources models due to its 
deterministic nature.  This enables the analyst to model the dynamic feedbacks from the 
ecological and policy sectors to individual behavior.  Importantly, the approach enables the 
analyst to address second-best decisions when the number of (and which) participants can not be 
feasibly regulated.   
  We illustrate the microparameter approach by investigating the problem of setting daily 
landing (bag) limits in a recreational fishery, a common management instrument in recreational 
fisheries (Radomski et al. 2001).  Prior research has mainly focused on the intensive margin, 
(e.g., Anderson 1983; McConnell and Sutinen 1978; Homans and Ruliffson 1999) or has used an   5
exogenously defined entry-exit function (Swallow 1994) thereby ignoring an important feedback 
from the ecological to the economic system.  Two exceptions are Anderson (1993), who focuses 
on first-best solutions, Woodward and Griffin (2003), who use a complex simulation model to 
examine welfare effects and account for extensive margin decisions.  We focus on second-best 
solutions, where the number of anglers is not a choice for the social planner.  In this case 
focusing on a representative angler or agent leads to qualitatively different results.   
 
Bioeconomics of Recreational Fisheries 
There is a long history of bioeconomic analysis for fishery management, but dynamic 
bioeconomic models of recreational angling are relatively rare.  Most fisheries bioeconomics 
work focuses on commercial fisheries or commercial representations of recreational fisheries 
(Smith et al. 2008).  Rational economic management is increasingly being embraced by fishery 
managers (Costello 2008; Hilborn 2007a,b).  The scarcity of bioeconomic models of recreational 
fisheries is surprising given that recreational landings can exceed commercial landings for 
important species (Bartholomew and Bohnsack 2005).  Recreational fisheries suffer from similar 
open access problems and stock externalities as commercial fisheries.  Two potential reasons for 
the scarcity of work on recreational fisheries are their non-market nature and the public trust 
tradition, which serve as institutional constraints.  Both of these suggest that second-best 
solutions are highly relevant.   
  Recreational fisheries managers and biologists are increasingly attempting to model 
angler behavior in a dynamic system (Cox et al. 2003; Post et al. 2003), perhaps do to a 
perceived neglect of recreational fisheries by economists. Of course, there is a large literature on 
recreational fishing in the environmental economics field relating to travel costs and contingent   6
valuation (see Johnston et al. 2006 for a review).  There is also a growing econometrics literature 
on modeling heterogeneity (e.g., Train 1998) and entry-exit decisions (Phaneuf et al. 2000).  All 
of these are data intensive, and there is not an obvious and succinct way to combine them with 
dynamic biological models and provide a second-best theory of recreational fishery management.            
  McConnell and Sutinen (1979) and Anderson (1983; 1993) provide a framework for 
modeling recreational angler behavior based on microeconomic theory.  Homans and Ruliffson 
(1999) and Woodward and Griffin (2003) have extended this work to examine structured fish 
populations and more complex policy instruments.  Their models capture individual angler 
behavior and describe the general nature of the aggregated recreational fishing demand.  Their 
models increase biological realism, but they do not address the details of summing over 
individual decisions to identify the total recreational angling effort or demand.  Anderson (1993) 
focuses on first-best management with homo- and heterogeneous anglers.  Woodward and 
Griffin (2003) aggregate over anglers in a simulation context, but do not provide a generalizable 
framework to sum over anglers to qualitatively understand extensive margin decisions.  The 
interaction between extensive and intensive margin decisions has important implication for 
angler surplus, angler behavior, and the ultimately fish stock.  Furthermore, angler surplus is not 
derived solely from landed fish in a recreational fishery.  There is value in the act of fishing.  
Therefore, there is surplus even in an open access fishery that results from anglers’ diminishing 
willingness to pay for increases in the quantity of fishing opportunities (Anderson 1983).  Even 
for relatively simple deterministic models, the solution is not simply a matter of finding the 
number of least-cost anglers that produce the “optimal escapement” as in commercial fisheries 
(e.g., Clark 1980).   
   7
Angler Behavior Model 
The individual angler 
For illustrative purposes we assume that anglers vary in costs and assume all anglers have the 
same individual angling preferences and skills.  Angler utility is  ()x s z m u U + = ) , , ( θ .  Following 
Anderson (1983), u is a quasi-concave, increasing function of days fished, m, and the quality of 
the fishery, z, which is increasing in the fish stock, s, and a decreasing function of restrictions on 
keeping fish θ.  Assume that um(m, z(s,θ)) > 0, uz(m, z(s, θ)) > 0, zs(s, θ) > 0, and zθ(s, θ) < 0, 
where subscripts denote partial derivatives.  We also assume marginal utility is downward 
sloping with increases in fishing days, umm(m, z(s, θ)) < 0, and that marginal utility is increasing 
fishing quality, umz(m, z(s,θ)) > 0.  The variable x is a composite numeraire good.  Each 
individual has a budget constraint given by I = x + cm, where I is income and c is the individual’s 
private unit cost of fishing.  This differs across individuals.  Using the budget constraint, we 
focus on the following affine transformation of utility, which is a measure of individual angler 
surplus due to the assumption of quasi-linear utility 
 (1)  () () cm s z m u V − = θ , ,  
Quasi-linear utility is a common assumption in the empirical literature that may have small 
effects on welfare estimates (Herriges and Kling 1999).  In a recreational fishery, the individual 
angler has two choices, i) whether or not to fish in a given season, and ii) how many days to fish 
given that he chooses to participate (Anderson 1983; McConnell and Sutinen 1979).  Anderson 
(1993) and Swallow (1994) recognize an additional choice of how many fish to keep because 
“catch and release” fishing is important in some recreational fisheries, though not in all 
(Bartholomew and Bohnsack 2005).  Anglers gain utility from both the process of catching fish 
as well has gaining the fish for food or trophy.  Assume that all else equal anglers would keep all   8
fish caught and are worse off with increased restriction on the number of fish kept uθ < 0.  Given 
this assumption we can focus on the proportion of fish that the angler is allowed to keep, p ∈ (0, 
1).  An increase in p is a relaxation of θ.   
An angler enters the fishery if V ≥ 0.  Given that an angler participates, he chooses the 
number of fishing days, m, to maximize utility. The optimal value of m solves 
(2)  0 )) , ( , ( = −c p s z m um ,  
and is written  () [] c p s z m m , ,
* = .  The resulting surplus is 
* * * )) , ( , ( ) , , ( cm p s z m u c p s V − = . 
 
Aggregating anglers 
To be able to couple the model of an individual angler’s behavior to the dynamics of a 
fish stock, we have to be able to aggregate and determine the total number of anglers 
participating, and their total impact on the fish stock.  Aggregated fishing related mortality 
(landings plus discard mortality) may have a large effect on the stock.
1  There are five ways the 
number of participating anglers could be modeled.   
First, the number of anglers could be a management choice.  Indeed, choosing the 
number of anglers would be necessary for first-best management.  This problem is addressed by 
Anderson (1993).
2  This may be feasible for some fisheries; however in general the total number 
of participants is not restricted.  Indeed, many fishery managers face incentives to maximize 
participation.  Generally, we assume that a first-best solution, where the number of anglers is 
directly chosen, does not satisfy institutional constraints.   
                                                 
1 Increasingly, there is also concern about how fishing alters stock structure (e.g., Wilberg et al. 2005).  This aspect 
of managing fishery problems has been initially treated by Woodward and Griffin (2005). 
2 Anderson (1993) points out that if anglers are heterogeneous the social planner also needs to choose which anglers 
participate for first-best management.   9
A second approach is taken by McConnell and Sutinen (1979); exogenously setting the 
number of participating anglers.   
The third approach sets the number of homogeneous anglers in open access such that all 
rents do to quality vanish (Anderson 1993).  However, if anglers are assumed to be completely 
homogeneous, then the number of anglers can not be determined endogenously.  If all anglers 
have identical preferences and costs, and anglers enter if they receive positive utility from doing 
so, then in open access all anglers will participate or none will participate depending on the 
quality of the fishery.  Furthermore, all anglers fish the same number of days.  Identical anglers 
make identical decisions on both the extensive and intensive margin.  Hence, defining the pool of 
potential anglers defines the number of anglers participating.  Similar issues have been identified 
in models of commercial fisheries (Clark 1980).   As fishing improves we expect more anglers to 
participate.  Additionally, we expect participating anglers to fish more days and gain a larger 
angler surplus.   
Swallow (1994) uses a forth approach and defines an exogenous function of angler entry 
and exit into the fishery, based on empirical work by Andrew and Wilen (1998) that does not 
explicitly model individual level decisions.  A variant on this approach is used by Woodward and 
Griffin (2005).  They include extensive margin decisions in a complex simulation model with 
entry-exit rules.  Yet, explicitly connecting the entry-exit decision to individual utility 
maximization decision is necessary to compute the marginal value of fishery improvements and 
understand how regulations may affect behavior and welfare. 
We propose a fifth approach.  To determine the total level of effort in the fishery, we 
recognize that each angler has a unique cost to fishing and think of c as a cost type.  Each cost   10
type is treated as a “micro-unit” (Hochman and Zilberman 1978).
3  Cost types are ordered in 
increasing order, such that the last cost type to enter the fishery is c ~ .  That is, c ~  is the cost at 
which the marginal angler is indifferent about entry and receives zero surplus. 
(3)  () ( ) 0 ~ , , ) , , (
* * * = − = m c p s z m u c p s V    
This condition implicitly defines c ~  as the function  ) , ( ~ p s c , with  0 ) , ( ~ > p s cs : a larger stock 
yields fishing quality improvements that induce entry by individuals with higher costs, 
increasing willingness to pay.  Increases in the landing limit (relaxing regulations) encourages 
entry resulting in a larger set of cost types entering,  0 ) , ( ~ > p s cp .  Specifically, participating cost 
types will be in the interval [] c ~ , 0 .   
  With a large number of potential anglers, we think of the cost types as being continuously 
distributed.  Cost types, c, are distributed over the interval [w,∞].  A density function ψ (with w ≥ 
0, if it is there is a minimal cost for a day of fishing w > 0; in the simulation model w = 0) is used 
to represent the distribution of these cost types.  We take the approach of using a probability 
density function to represent the proportion of the total potential anglers, N, that participate.  If N 
is the total number of potential anglers (N = 1×10
6 in the numerical example), then the number of 
active anglers in the fishery, n(s), depends on the size of the stock and regulations.
4  
(4)     ∫ =
c
dc c N p s n
~
0
) ( ) , ( ψ  
                                                 
3 We include heterogeneity across anglers’ cost of fishing, but recognize that anglers have heterogeneous 
preferences for fishing and heterogeneous skill levels resulting in different catch rates per anglers.  The 
incorporation of these differences is left for future analysis.  We discuss how this assumption may affect the optimal 
daily catch limit.  This assumption enables to focus on the main contribution of the paper – demonstrating the 
importance of including heterogeneity in bioeconomic models if nonmarket demand using microparameter models.  
Hochman and Zilberman (1979) discuss how to incorporate multiple sources of heterogeneity in microparameter 
models.   
4 Defining the angler pool is not straight forward.  However, as long as care is taken so that the distribution of c is 
taken into account, an appropriate angler pool can be defined.     11
Total angler surplus, B, is the sum of angler surplus received by all individual anglers at time t, 
and is also a function of salmon biomass and regulations. 
(5)  () ( ) ∫ = =
c
dc c c p s V N p s B t B
~
0
) ( ) , , ( , ψ  
Total catch per unit time, h(s,p), is derived similarly.   
(6)  ∫ =
c
dc c p s z m N p s h
~
0
* ) ( ) , ( ) , ( ψ  
In some recreational fisheries release or discard mortality may be significant (Bartholomew and 
Bohnsack 2005; Coggins et al. 2007).  If there is discard mortality, where x is the proportion of 
discarded fish that subsequently die, the total fishing induced mortality is 
(7)  () [] ∫ − + =
c
dc c x p p p s z m N p s F
~
0
* ) ( 1 ) , ( ) , ( ψ  
 
Fish stock dynamics 
To understand the dynamic nature of the system we couple our model of angler behavior to a 
population model for a fish stock.  Given our focus on the effect of heterogeneity and entry-exit 
decisions, we focus on a simple model where fishing affects mortality, but does not affect the 
structure of the stock.  We represent the stock dynamics as  
(8)  () p s F s sG s , ) ( − = &  
where G is a concave net growth function (e.g. the logistic growth function – Clark 2005).  It is 
also convenient to introduce notation for the harvest per angler day.  We follow the standard 
Shaffer model and write catch per unit effort (per m) as qs, where q is the catchability 
coefficient.     12
 
Management scenarios  
Pure open-access, no regulations  
  Given our assumptions that, all else equal, anglers prefer to land the fish that they catch, 
we set p = 1.  In this case there will be no release so the value of x is irrelevant.   
  In the case of homogeneous anglers Anderson (1993) states that each individual angler 
should solve condition (2) giving m* for all anglers, and the net utility gain must go to zero 
giving n.  The problem with this formulation is that there is no market to coordinate anglers.  The 
simple case is where the implied n > N.  In this case, all anglers, N, enter and continue to earn 
rents (Anderson 1933 address this case).  Because recreational fishing is a non-market good, 
additional anglers can not be induced to enter the fishery.  In our model, anglers do not consider 
rents to other anglers when they fish.  For this reason the reverse case, n < N, makes little sense.  
If an individual angler would gain a positive benefit from entering at a given level of s, then the 
angler should enter.  Furthermore, if all anglers are the same, then if one angler enters, they 
should all enter.  Hence the formation n < N does not correspond to microeconomic individual 
decision making.  The only alternative to this is to choose N exogenously.  But, if N is allowed to 
change with the stock size, then anglers must not be homogeneous. 
  Anglers must be heterogeneous to have anything other than knife’s edge entry and exit.  
Exogenous entry-exit functions could be developed.  Yet, to understand how a regulation affects 
behavior, entry-exit decisions must be based on microeconomic decision making, especially 
when a second-best policy that does not directly control entry and exit is considered.  This may 
be handled with the micro-parameter approach.  Equation (7) may be substituted into equation 
(8).  Setting (8) equal to zero and solving for s gives the unregulated equilibrium stock size, s
∞.    13
This value of s
∞ may be substituted into equations (4) – (6) to find the number of anglers 
participating, the aggregated angler surplus, and the total harvest.   
 
Management with daily landing limits. 
In the first-best case the manager chooses the daily landing limit, m* for each angler, and n; 
nothing is left to the individual (see Anderson 1993 for a discussion of this problem).  The more 
interesting problem is what happens when the manager must choose regulations within the 
bounds of an institutional constraint.  We focus on the case when the social planner is 
constrained to only setting a daily landing limit.  Assume that managers can perfectly institute a 
daily landing limit with zero management costs, and that x = 0.  The daily landing limit is 
() () () t p t qs t = θ , where p ∈ (0,1).  It is more convenient to work in terms of  qs p θ = .   
  The manager’s problem is to maximize the discounted aggregated angler surplus over an 
infinite time horizon subject to equation (8) and initial conditions.  For the homogeneous angler 
problem this is    









dt e cm p s z m u n ρ  s.t. (8) and s(0) 
where ρ is the discount rate.  Recall that the actual number of anglers, n, is constant and equal to 
the number of potential anglers in N in the homogeneous angler case.  Also, F(s,p) in equation 
(8) is replaced with qsnm*.  The Hamiltonian for the problem is  
  () () [] ( )
* 1 ) ( , *, qsnm s sG cm p s z m u n H − + − = λ  
where λ is the co-state variable.  The Hamiltonian is a welfare measure.  The right-hand-side 
(RHS) is net benefits to society from recreational angling conditional on a choice of p and the 
effects of the choice of p on changes in the fish stock.  The co-state variable is assumed to be   14
positive as this represents the shade price for the fish stock - an asset.  For the first-order, 
0
1 = p H , and adjoint condition 
1
s H − = ρλ λ & , from the maximum principle (Conrad and Clark 
1987) to lead to an optimal control the strong Legendre-Clebsch (LC) condition (i.e.,  0
1 < pp H ) 
must be satisfied (Robbins 1967).  This condition is a corollary to the maximum principle when 
the control variable takes an interior value.   
(9)  ( ) ( ) [ ]
* * * * 1 2 pp mm p mp p pp pp pp pp nqsm u m u m c u m u n H λ − + + − + =  
The sign of 
1
pp H is generally ambiguous.  However, in a special case where the utility function 
results in a linear individual demand function for fishing services, i.e., 
um(m, z(s, p)) = (z1+z2p)qs – ym, which we consider in our simulations, 
1
pp H > 0.
5  Consider the 
first term; the one in the square brackets, and let this term equal Θ.  In our special case only the 
third term of Θ is non-zero, and this term in >0 ( 0
* = = pp pp m u ).  To see this, note that 
mm p mp u m u
* = .  Now consider the second term.  In the special case this term is zero.  Therefore, 
for the special case there is no optimal traditional optimal control.  The optimal path in this case 
must be a sequence of extreme controls as in a Bolza type problem known as chattering (Clark 
2005 pp.147-149) or sliding (Zelikin and Borisov 1994) controls (this can be shown to be the 
case numerically).  Therefore, applying the necessary conditions associated with the maximum 
principle (i.e., the standard first order and adjoint conditions) to this problem would lead to a 
minimum if anything.  These conditions may provide some more intuition as the state variable 
solution is the limit of the chattering sequence (Clark 2005). 
                                                 
5 We consider this special case because it permits a corner solution even in the case when there is only one good or 
site to choose from.  Specifically, our model provides a choke price as shown below.      15
         Now consider the problem when the manager accounts for individual heterogeneity and 
extensive margin decisions.  In this case the manager’s problem is  








, max   s.t. (8) and s(0) 
The Hamiltonian for this version of the problem is  
  ()( ) ) , ( ) ( ,
2 p s F s sG p s B H − + = λ  
First, we verify the LC condition to determine if the maximum principle may lead to an optimal 
control path.  This is done is two steps relating to the terms in H
2.  Initially, 
2
pp H  appears rather 
complex, but greatly simplifies when condition (3) is accounted for.  The second derivate of the 











+ − Θ = ∫ p c p p
c






ψ ψ  
The first term on the RHS is suitable average of angler cost types.  There is no reason that this 
could not be a representative angler, at least for a given stock size.  Of course, the representative 
angler would have to change as the fish stock size changed.   Assuming that the term in the round 
brackets is positive, as in our special case, the second term in the square brackets is < 0.  
Moreover, in our special case  0 ) , ( < pp p s B.   Now consider the second derivative of the second 
term of H
2, which is 
(11)  ( )⎥ ⎦
⎤
⎢ ⎣
⎡ + + − = − ∫ c m m c c c qs dc c qsm N p s F c p p
c
pp pp






* ψ ψ λ λ  
The first term on the RHS is a suitable average of angler types.  As with the (10) presumably a 
suitable representative angler could be chosen to make this term equal to the second RHS term in 
equation (9).  There is no guarantee it is the same value as the suitable average for the first term,   16
and like the first term would change with changes in the fish stock.  The second RHS in (11) 
term is positive.  Assuming that the first RHS term in (11) is positive, then (11) is negative.  
Therefore,  
1 2
pp pp H H < .  This implies that when heterogeneity is considered an interior optimal 
path may emerge.  Indeed, in the special case the first RHS term in (11) vanishes.  So that 
. 0
2 < pp H      
  Now that we have established that the maximum principle may yield an optimal path, and 
that the maximum principle does yield an optimal control in the special case.  The first order 
condition is   
(12)  () () 0 , , = ∂ ∂ − ∂ ∂ = ∂ ∂ p p s F p p s B p H λ  
A second condition, which must be satisfied along an optimal path, is the adjoint or arbitrage 
condition 
(13)  2
s H − = ρλ λ & .   
Expressing this adjoint condition as a golden rule equation yields   



















   
The golden rule equation is a rate of return condition.  It implies that the stock should be 
managed to provide a return equal to the social discount rate, ρ.  The left-hand-side term, the 
social discount rate, is the marginal cost to society of forgoing harvests today and leaving more 
fish in the stock.  The RHS is the marginal benefit of an increase in the stock.  The first RHS 
term in equation (14) is a capital gains term, which is zero at equilibrium.  The second RHS term 
is the marginal value of an increase in the stock size on the total angler surplus.  This term is 
positive.  The third RHS term is the stock’s own rate of return and could be positive or negative 
depending on the stock size.  The fourth RHS term is the marginal impact of an increase in the   17
stock on mortality due to fishing mediated through angler behavior.  This term is expected to be 
positive, ceteris paribus.  If the second term is greater than the fourth term by a difference >ρ, 
then, at equilibrium, the third RHS term necessarily will be negative, implying a stock size 
greater than the maximum sustained yield level.  In such a case a recreational fish stock managed 
for escapement equal to the maximum sustained yield level would be overfished from a 
bioeconomic perspective.   
  Condition (12) also implies   
(15)  () ()() p s h p s B p s p p , , , = λ    
Differentiating (12) with respect to time and substituting (13) and (15) gives an implicit function 
of  p & , which may be manipulated to give  ( ) p s p p , & & = .  To find the optimal equilibria set  p &  and 
s & equal to zero and solve for s = s
* and p = p
*.           
 
Numerical Simulation 
  To complete our analysis we now turn to a numerical simulation based on the special 
case of um(m, z(s, p)) = (z1+z2p)qs – ym and  ( ) s r s G Δ − = 1 ) ( .  The linearity of um implies a 
choke, (z1+z2p)qs, at which an angler ceases to fish.  The chock price is a function of fishing 
quality and the management policy.  We specify a log-normal distribution for angler cost types.
6  
Parameters and their values used on our simulation are listed in Table 1.
7  Values in the 
numerical simulation are chosen to represent a sport fishery that by common measures is over 
exploited; as such a fishery would be of high concern to managers (Post et al. 2002).  Analyses 
were conducted using Mathematica 6.0 (Wolfram Research).   
                                                 
6 Just and Antle (1990) recommend the log-normal distribution for micro-parameter models as a default. 
7 This calibration implies that the greatest marginal value comes from keeping fish.  This is not true in all fisheries 
and affects the optimal daily catch limit.  We have chosen this parameterization as realistic for some fisheries and to 
demonstrate the utility of modeling angler behavior using the microparameter approach.      18
  For the numerical example, the unregulated equilibrium is compute numerically to be 
s
∞ = 1.32×10
6 fish or 29% of the unfished stock size (1/Δ).  This stock size s
∞ is then applied in 
equations (4), (5), and (6) to compute the number of anglers participating (591,563), the total 
angler surplus ($1.2×10
7), and the catch (974,437) in a given year at equilibrium.  If the 
unregulated equilibrium is the initial condition, then the net present value of angler surplus at the 
unregulated equilibrium over an infinite time horizon is  8 10 4 . 2 × = ρ B .   
  Consider the second-best solution when the analyst assumes a representative angler.  
There can be no interior optimal control because the LC condition is > 0 for our functional 
forms.  A sequence of control alternating between p = 0 and p = 1 is required.  Numerically, we 
verify that such a sequence of control yields higher aggregated angler surplus than open access, 
p = 1, (which is greater than a complete closure of the fishery p = 0).  The state variable solution 
from the first order and adjoint conditions is 2.58×10
6 fish (57% of the unfished stock size).  
This is the limit of the optimal sequence (Clark 2005).  This is greater than the open access stock 
size and maximum sustained yield level, 1/(2Δ).  
  Now consider the second-best solution when managers account for heterogeneity when 
choosing the efficient daily landing limit when x = 0.  Given the parameters in Table 1, we apply 
the maximum principle and find a bioeconomic equilibrium for s
* = 2.89×10
6 and p
* = 0.38.  As 
expected, when the daily landing limit is chosen efficiently the stock size at equilibrium is larger 
than the open access case (64% of the unfished stock size).  It is greater than the stock size that is 
the limit of the sequence of chattering controls in the representative angler case and greater than 
the maximum sustained yield level. 
  The value of p
* implies a daily landing limit of  76 . 0 = θ  fish/day.  Of course, anglers can 
not catch non-integer values of fish, but such a limit may approximate weekly limits and is   19
informative about the ability to use daily catch limits to manage a recreational fishery.  Swallow 
(1994) makes a similar generalization in his theoretical study of daily landing limits.  Fisheries 
biologist have suggested that daily catch limits would have to be quite low to have a biological 
effect (Cook et al. 2001; Post et al. 2002; Radomski et al. 2001).  As expected, total angler 
surplus at equilibrium is higher (1.93×10
7) with more anglers participating (655,744) (Figure 1) 
and the average angler surplus is greater than in the open access case.  It should also be 
emphasized that while total catch is greater, only 36% of the stock is harvested per year as 
compared to 71% in the open-access case.   
  We consider the effects on the capital fish stock and the approach path to the equilibrium.  
We linearize the  p s & & −  system at the equilibrium and find one positive and one negative 
eigenvalue, indicating the equilibrium is a conditionally stable equilibrium (Conrad and Clark 
1987).  The saddle path to the equilibrium is identified (Figure 2).  The phase-plane shows that at 
low stock sizes the proportion of the fish caught in a day that should be kept is low, i.e., the daily 
catch limit should be set at low levels, and increase monotonically to the equilibrium.  Starting at 
high stock levels, the proportion of the fish caught in a day that should be kept is high, i.e., the 
daily catch limit should allow more fish to be kept, and decrease monotonically as the stock the 
approach equilibrium.  The optimal daily catch limit increases the net present value of the total 
angler surplus to 4.68×10
8.  This is much greater than the open access level. 
  When discard mortality is strictly positive (x > 0), the sign of H
2 is ambiguous, even in 
the special.  For the parameters in Table 1 a sufficiently large value of x (approximately x > 0.1) 
results in the LC condition evaluating > 0.  In such a case an interior control does not exist.  
Numerically, we evaluate a sequence of switches between p = 0 and p = 1, the resulting angler 
surplus in greater than open access (which is greater than a complete closure of the fishery).  The   20
stock size that is the limit of the sequence (the state variable solution) is between the open access 
and efficient bioeconomic equilibrium for x = 0.  With discard mortality the efficient stock size 
will be smaller than with no discard mortality.           
   
4. Sensitivity Analysis 
Table 2 presents a summary of sensitivity analysis results for response variables at equilibrium or 
in the case of the net present value of angler surplus over an infinite time horizon starting at the 
unregulated equilibrium, with respect to a 5% increase in each parameter.  The optimality of a 
daily catch limit is not affected by small changes in parameter values.  Moreover, the optimal 
daily catch limits are less than unit elastic to each parameter, but are most sensitive to catchablity 
and to the parameter associated with the marginal value of catching, though not landing 
additional fish.  This is particularly interesting because the model was calibrated such that 
landing an additional fish was three times more valuable than simply catching an additional fish.  
This indicates the potential importance of catch and release regulations (though release mortality 
merits explicit consideration).  The sensitivity with respect to catchablity indicates the potential 
for gear regulations and the potential importance of angler heterogeneity in skill, though this is 
left to future investigations.   
  Carrying capacity, catchablity, the marginal value of additional days of fishing, and 
marginal value of catching an additional fish have the greatest impact on the net present value of 
angler surplus for the optimally managed fishery.  But, biological parameters, catchablitiy, and 
the discount rate have the greatest impact on the net present value of angler surplus for the 
unregulated fishery.  In the unregulated case increases in the average cost of fishing increase the 
value of the fishery.  This potentially indicates an economic justification for the presence of   21
regulatory fishing fees.  The microeconomic parameter with the greatest affect on the value of 
the unregulated fishery is the marginal value of keeping an additional fish.  The effect of 
parameter changes on stock sizes showed similar relationships. 
 
Discussion 
Incorporating heterogeneity shows the analyst that human behavior will adjust more sluggishly 
to marginal changes in the state of the world and policies, thereby leading to a saddle path (Liski 
et al. 2001).  Incorporating heterogeneity reveals that adjustment is sluggish because it reveals 
that the system is buffered by two effects.  The first effect relates to intensive margin decisions.  
Agents vary their intensive margin decision as the state of the world changes, which also 
happens with a representative agent model.  But when heterogeneity is included in the model, all 
agents are not “forced” to make the same decision.  The second, and perhaps more important, 
effect is the ability of agents to decide to enter or exit the system.  In our example, the 
cumulative result is that the overall angler population is less sensitive to marginal changes in the 
state of the fishery and regulations.  This may hamper rapid changes in the state of system, which 
may have implication for rapid conservation or invasive species control.  But, it also means that 
by considering agent heterogeneity managers can devise more efficient management programs.    
  Management of ecosystem services (Daily et al. 2000) will often be second-best and 
many of these services are not traded in the market.  There is a critical need for economist to play 
a role in understanding the allocation of such services.  Policymakers are more likely to be 
interested in the nature of second-best management as often there are formal or informal 
institutions that constrain management.  In many cases, limiting entry is not a viable policy 
option.  A corollary to this research is when managers can not force compliance as is often the   22
case with free-ride and weakest link problems.  A similar formation may be useful for analysis of 
these problems.  Moreover, managers may wish to restrict human impacts without explicitly 
excluding individuals.  In such cases it will not be logically consistent to consider such policies 
without the inclusion of agent type heterogeneity.  In this paper we have shown how agent type 
heterogeneity may be modeled by making distributional assumptions.  Such models could open 
the door for increased consideration of second-best management for non-market goods.   
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Value in the 
simulation 
q  Catchability coefficient   7 × 10
7 
z1  Marginal effect on utility of catching fish  10 
z2  Marginal effect on utility of keeping fish  30 
y  Marginal effect on utility of fish an additional day  10 
 μ  Average cost type  45 
σ  Standard deviation of cost types  50.3 
r  intrinsic growth rate  1.04 
Δ  Inverse of the carrying capacity  1/(4.56 ×10
6) 
x  Discard mortality  0 
ρ  Discount rate  0.05 
N  Pool of potential anglers  1 × 10
6   28
Table 2. Sensitivity analysis: parameter values and the percent change in response variable at equilibrium for a 5% increase in each 










z1  z2  y  ρ  r k q 
NPVAS (×10
8)  2.36 2.38 2.38  2.38 2.40 2.41 2.25 2.52 2.42 2.27 
(% change)    (0.6%)  (0.6%)  (0.7%)  (1.6%) (2.0%) (-4.8%) (6.7%) (2.6%) (-3.9%) 
fish stock (×10
6)  1.32 1.35 1.32  1.31 1.35 1.28 1.32 1.35 1.33 1.24 
(% change)    (2.1%)  (-0.3%)  (-1.0%) (2.0%) (-3.0%) (0.0%) (2.0%) (0.8%) (-5.9%) 
Unregulated 
fishery 
%  unfished  stock  29.1% 29.7% 29.0%  28.8% 29.7% 28.2% 29.1% 29.7% 27.9% 27.4% 
NPVAS (×10
8)  4.68 4.57 4.73  4.92 4.92 4.85 4.48 4.82 5.09 4.92 
(% change)    (-2.3%)  (1.0%)  (5.1%)  (5.1%) (3.7%) (-4.1%) (3.1%) (8.9%) (5.1%) 
proportion of 
fish kept 
0.38 0.39 0.38  0.36 0.39 0.37 0.38 0.39 0.35 0.34 






limits  fish stock (×10
6)  2.89 2.87 2.89  2.94 2.88 2.87 2.88 2.88 3.07 2.94   29
(% change)    (-0.6%)  (0.1%)  (1.9%)  (-0.3%) (-0.6%) (-0.2%) (-0.4%) (6.3%)  (1.9%) 
%  unfished  stock  63.7% 63.3% 63.7%  64.9% 63.5% 63.3% 63.6% 63.4% 64.5% 64.9% 
catch  limit  0.76 0.78 0.76  0.73 0.79 0.75 0.76 0.78 0.75 0.73 
(% change)    (2.8%)  (-0.3%)  (-3.9%) (3.2%) (-2.0%) (0.2%) (2.8%) (-0.9%) (-3.9%) 
Percent increase in NPVAS 
through management 







Figure 1.  Illustration of the intertemporal tradeoffs following the saddle path from the open 
access equilibrium to the optimal equilibrium for angler surplus (panel A), participating anglers 
(panel B), and landed catch (panel C).  The flat lines represent the open access equilibrium. 
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Panel C   31
 
 
Figure 2. Phase plane showing the optimal proportion of catch that may be kept, the daily 
optimal daily catch limit is computed pqs, where q is the catchablity. Point A indicates the 
optimal equilibrium.  The separatrices are indicated with arrows pointing to the equilibrium.  
Phase arrows indicated the local dynamics.   
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